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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court periodically addresses 
claims from individual property owners that their private property 
has been taken from them by governmental action for which they 
are entitled to be justly compensated under the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.1 Such a case was 
decided during the last term of the Supreme Court in Murr v. 
Wisconsin, wherein the Court, by a 5–3 majority, held that the 
merger provision of an environmental protection zoning statute 
did not amount to a taking.2 
Takings cases arise either as a result of a direct taking, or a 
so-called regulatory taking. Instances where a governmental 
entity seeks to occupy or take title to private property are direct 
 
 
* Professor of Law at Roger Williams University School of Law. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The final clause of the Fifth Amendment 
reads, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.” Id. 
2. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949 (2017). 
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takings.3 When the government does not seek to physically  
acquire or occupy the land, but merely to regulate its use, an 
owner may still seek just compensation on the theory that the 
regulation in effect took the property by depriving the owner of its 
use and value.4 Murr v. Wisconsin is an example of a regulatory 
takings case. 
The petitioners in Murr were a set of four siblings who owned 
two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) along the St. Croix River in 
northwest Wisconsin.5 The St. Croix River is a scenic vista, and 
has been protected under federal and state law dating back to the 
1970s.6 The lots in question were originally acquired by the 
petitioners’ parents in 1960 (Lot F) and 1963 (Lot E).7 The 
topography of the lots is quite unique.8 Each lot has a higher level 
portion that drops off into a steep bluff down to a lower level 
portion along the riverfront.9 Additionally, both lots measure 
approximately 1.25 acres overall, but because of the waterline and 
the steep bank, each has considerably less land suitable for 
development.10 During the three decades of the Murr parents’ 
ownership of these lots, title to Lot E was held in the parents’ 
names while Lot F was titled in the name of the family plumbing 
company.11 The Murr parents built a cabin for their family’s 
recreational use on Lot F, but did not undertake any development 
 
 
3. Direct takings typically proceed by the governmental entity giving 
notice of its intention to take or condemn the identified property. See, e.g., 
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951). Legal challenges to 
direct takings normally consist of the owner contesting the amount of 
compensation offered as being insufficient to justly compensate the loss 
occasioned by the taking. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 
(1992). On rare occasions, the owner may contest the entire condemnation on 
the theory that the taking is not for a “public use” as in Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
4. In the seminal regulatory takings case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), Justice Holmes stated, “while property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.” 
5. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1939, 40. 
6. Id. at 1940. 
7. Id. 
8. See id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 1941. 
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of the adjacent Lot E.12 
The regulatory scheme that the federal government initiated 
in 1972 with the passage of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and 
the Lower Saint Croix River Act of 1972 designated the river for 
protection against overdevelopment that might undermine the 
picturesque grandeur and recreational value of the river and the 
surrounding area.13  The Lower Saint Croix River Act required  
the State of Wisconsin to enact a management and development 
program for the river, which it did by statute,14 and by regulations 
promulgated thereunder by the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) by 1976.15 For the area where the Murr lots are 
located, the state DNR regulations prevent the use of the lots as 
separate building sites unless they have at least one acre of land 
suitable for development, which neither Lot E nor Lot F had by 
virtue of their unique topography.16 However, like many other 
land use regulatory regimes, the DNR regulations grandfathered 
pre-existing substandard lots which were in separate ownership 
as of January 1, 1976, when the regulations took effect.17 Such 
pre-existing non-conforming lots in separate ownership (like lots E 
and F while the Murr parents and the family plumbing company 
owned them separately) were allowed to be developed as separate 
building sites.18 Again the DNR regulations, like many other land 
use regulatory regimes, also contained a merger provision which 
provides that adjacent substandard lots under common ownership 
“may not be ‘sold or developed as separate lots’ since they 
separately did not meet the size requirement.”19 The DNR 
regulations also required localities such as St. Croix County to 
adopt parallel provisions, which it did in its zoning ordinance.20 
Eventually the Murr parents transferred these lots to their 
four children (the petitioners) in 1994 (Lot F) and 1995 (Lot E).21 
 
 
12. Id. at 1940, 41. 
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(6), (a)(9) (2012). 
14. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 30.27(l) (West 2017). 
15. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.01–.09 (West 2017). 
16. “Even when combined, the lots’ buildable area is only 0.98 acres due 
to the steep terrain.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4)(a)(2)). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 1941. 
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Title to both lots was taken in the names of the four Murr 
siblings.22 By the mid-2000’s, the cabin on Lot F had fallen into 
disrepair, and the Murr siblings sought to sell Lot E to fund the 
improvement and movement of the cabin to a different location on 
Lot F.23 Neither Lot E nor Lot F contained the minimum one acre 
of land suitable for development, and by now they were in common 
ownership which triggered the merger provisions of the local 
zoning ordinance and the state DNR regulations.24 
The Murr siblings sought relief from the strict enforcement of 
the regulations by applying for variances from the Saint Croix 
County Board of Adjustment (the Board) that would permit the 
separate sale or use of the substandard lots, without which they 
claimed they would be unable to improve or move the cabin on Lot 
F.25 The Board denied the requested variances,  and  the 
Wisconsin state courts affirmed the Board’s denial, agreeing with 
the Board’s interpretation that the ordinance “effectively merged” 
Lots E and F, so that the Murr siblings, “could only sell or build on 
the single larger lot.”26 This led the Murr siblings to bring the 
inverse takings action in state court, claiming that the state and 
county regulations amounted to a regulatory taking by depriving 
them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot 
cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.”27 The trial court 
granted summary judgment to the state, finding that the Murrs 
retained various options for the use and enjoyment of their land 
(they could preserve the existing cabin, relocate the cabin, or 
eliminate the cabin and build a new residence on Lot E, on Lot F 
or across both lots).28  The trial court also found the Murrs had  
not been deprived of all economic value of their property by the 
mandated merger of lots E and F, since the appraised values 
presented by the state showed only a minimal decrease in market 
value (less than 10%) for the merged lots ($698,300) as compared 
to what they might be worth as two separate lots ($771,000).29 
 
22. See id. 
23. Id. 
24. See id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. (quoting Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d 
837, 844 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011)). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court and 
rejected the owners’ request to analyze the effect of the  
regulations on Lot E only.30 Instead, the state appeals court held 
the takings analysis properly focused “on the Murrs’ property as a 
whole”—that is, the merged Lots E and F together.31 From that 
perspective, there was not a sufficient deprivation of all or 
practically all of the economic value of the Murrs’ property.32 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court did not grant review, which led to the 
Murrs’ petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.33 
I. REGULATORY TAKINGS BACKGROUND 
Governments have historically taken private property from 
individual owners through the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain34 when it was perceived that there was a public need for 
that property.35 It is logical that the government would not want 
to rely solely on the free will, market-based decisions of an 
individual owner to agree to sell his property to the government at 
a fair price when there might be significant temptation for that 
individual to hold out or extort the government in its circumstance 
of need. The power of eminent domain was so inherent to the 
founding fathers’ notion of government that the first seven articles 
that made up the original U.S. Constitution neither mentioned it 
nor delegated it to any particular branch of government.36 The 
primary goal of the founders at the Constitutional Convention in 
 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 1941. 
33. Id. 
34. The term “eminent domain” was derived from De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 
(On the Law of War and Peace), a legal treatise written by the Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius in 1625, and is still used in the United States to describe the 
power of the government to condemn and appropriate property from 
individual owners (the same concept is referred to today in England as 
“Compulsory Purchase”). JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 
§ 1.12 (3d ed. 2015). 
35. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (“It has not been 
seriously contended during the argument that the United States government 
is without power to appropriate lands or other property within the States for 
its own uses, and to enable it to perform its proper functions.”). 
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 delegates to Congress the “Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” but this does not 
seem to speak with any specificity about takings or eminent domain. 
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1787 was to address the shortcomings of the structures of 
government outlined in the predecessor Articles of 
Confederation.37 Therefore, the original seven Articles of the new 
Constitution did not address the relationship between the 
individual and the government.38 The first ten amendments to  
the Constitution (usually referred to as “The Bill of Rights,” 
adopted by Congress in 1789 and ratified by the States by 1791) 
were intended to clarify the rights and liberties of individuals or 
the people collectively vis-à-vis the government that had not 
previously been addressed.39 
The Fifth Amendment contains two clauses germane to 
individual property ownership and the government’s power to 
appropriate such property. The first is the “Due Process” clause, 
which continues the theme set out throughout the Fifth 
Amendment of what a person shall not be required to suffer at the 
hands of the government: “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”40 The final clause of the 
Fifth Amendment then provides: “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”41 This is the so- 
called “Takings Clause,” although it is sometimes referred to as 
the “Just Compensation Clause” depending upon whether one is 
focusing on the government’s power to take or the individual’s 
right to be justly compensated for what has been taken. 
Direct takings initiated by declarations of intent to condemn 
continue even today, but a new type of takings claim—the so- 
 
37. See John P. Roche, The Triumph of Reform Politics: Overthrowing 
the Articles of Confederation, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 809, 809 (1987). 
38. See Garrett Epps, The Bill of Rights, 82 OR. L. REV. 517, 518–19 
(2003) (noting that the framers did not include these provisions because 
individual rights were already provided for by the states). 
39. See id. 
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
41. Id. This same notion has inserted itself into the foundational or 
constitutional principles of many other nations. For example, the 
Constitution of Australia permits the federal government to make laws with 
respect to “the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person 
for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.” 
Australian Constitution s 51(xxxi). The French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen mandates that “just and prior indemnity” be paid before 
expropriation of private property. 1791 CONST. art. 17. Article eight of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its accompanying protocols 
contain similar protections against uncompensated interference with one’s 
home and possessions. See E.T.S. No. 5, art. 8. 
 104 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:98 
 
called “Regulatory Taking”—joined them in the early years of the 
twentieth century.42 The early part of the last century saw the 
advent of comprehensive land use planning through the 
development of zoning.43 Landowners, alleging pre-zoning 
unlimited rights to use their land in any way they chose, or as the 
market dictated, brought inverse takings claims on the basis that 
the municipality had deprived them of some quotient of their 
ownership rights through zoning.44 These challenges generally 
failed as in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., where the 
Supreme Court upheld zoning as a legitimate exercise of the 
government’s “police power” to take reasonable action to protect 
the public health, safety, and welfare.45 In part, those early 
decisions (and even some much more recent ones) rest on long- 
standing background principles of nuisance law that already 
limited what an owner of land could do on his or her property.46 
Under nuisance law, uses that unreasonably interfere with the 
reasonable use and enjoyment rights of adjacent landowners 
(private nuisance), or the peace, safety and tranquility of the 
general public or community (public nuisance) may be enjoined in 
equity.47 These inherent background principles suggest that a 
government regulation that prohibits a property owner from doing 
something that is harmful to the public welfare is not a taking 
since the property owner never had the right to use their property 
 
 
42. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) 
(concluding that “if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking”); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) 
(identifying that the language in Mahon gave birth to regulatory takings). 
43. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926); 
see also 1 Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly, Zoning and Land Use 
Controls § 1.02[1] (recounting that “[i]t was not until the twentieth century, 
however, that local governments began to develop comprehensive zoning of 
uses throughout a community”). 
44. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365 (“The ordinance is assailed 
on the grounds that it is in derogation of section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution in that it deprives appellee of liberty 
and property without due process of law and denies it the equal protection of 
the law, and that it offends against certain provisions of the Constitution of 
the state of Ohio.”). 
45. Id. at 389–90. 
46. See, e.g., id. at 387–88 (explaining that “the law of nuisances . . . may 
be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its 
analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of the [police] power”). 
47. Nuisance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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to commit that harm. 
Comprehensive community planning such as zoning was not 
the only type of regulation of private property owners that 
government attempted in the early part of the twentieth century. 
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a valid regulatory taking 
claim in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, when interpreting a  
coal mining regulation enacted by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, which required the owners of the sub-surface coal 
deposits to remove the coal in such a way so as to guarantee the 
vertical support of the owners of the surface lands above the 
coal.48 While perhaps a legitimate exercise of the State’s police 
power, Justice Holmes ruled that “while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”49 This simple rule has engendered a 
complex body of decisional law in the ninety-five years since 1922. 
During that interval, we have seen much more extensive efforts by 
government at all levels—federal, state, and local—to adopt 
regulations that promote or protect the public health, safety and 
welfare.50 Individuals and entities impacted by those regulations 
have pushed back by seeking just compensation for what they 
claim is a regulatory taking of their private property rights.51 
The complexity of “regulatory takings” law that has evolved 
since Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon has extended to increased 
efforts by government bodies to protect environmentally or 
culturally sensitive areas by extensive and diverse protective 
regulations.52 Government entities regulate private property 
owners in many ways and those regulations apply in varying 
circumstances and contexts. If the regulation is so burdensome 
that it denies the property owner all economically beneficial or 
productive use of the property, then it is deemed a “categorical 
 
48. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). 
49. Id. at 415. 
50. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1047 (1998) 
(noting that “[m]ore than a century ago, the Court explicitly upheld the right 
of States to prohibit uses of property injuries to public health, safety, or 
welfare without paying compensation”). 
51. See, e.g., id. at 1009 (“Lucas promptly filed suit in the  South 
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that the Beachfront 
Management Act’s construction bar effected a taking of his property without 
just compensation.”). 
52. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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taking” that must be justly compensated under the Takings 
Clause.53 Short of a complete denial of all productive use, 
adjudging whether the extent of the regulation is a permissible 
exercise of the police power or goes “too far” requires ad hoc and 
perhaps unpredictable facts and circumstances analyses.  That 
was the case forty years ago in a landowner’s challenge to New 
York City’s historic landmark preservation law designed to protect 
structures of architectural and cultural significance.54 Even 
though the Supreme Court found no unconstitutional taking in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court 
nonetheless gave us the now familiar set of “Penn Central” factors 
to be balanced to determine whether regulation has gone “too far” 
stating: 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, 
the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that 
have particular significance. The economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations. So, too, is the character of the 
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be 
found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than 
when interference arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.55 
. . . 
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have been entirely 
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular  
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court 
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on 
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in 
 
 
53. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
54. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115–16 
(1978). 
55. Id. at 124 (internal citations omitted). 
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the parcel as a whole ....... 56 
Particularized fact-intensive legal inquiries arise frequently 
in connection with regulations intended to protect  
environmentally sensitive areas, whether along scenic rivers or in 
fragile coastal zones.57 Courts adjudicating the inverse takings 
claims that riparian or coastal property owners have  brought 
must apply the Penn Central factors in resolving a myriad of 
questions, such as the value of the land in question, including 
whether all economically beneficial or productive use of the land 
has been denied; whether an owner’s investment-backed 
expectations are “reasonable” and, if so, to what extent does the 
regulation interfere.58 Similarly, the courts will inquire into 
whether the owner has been deprived of his property when he 
retains significant and valuable (albeit reduced) use of the parcel 
as a whole despite the regulation.59 Additional questions address 
general welfare and fairness, including whether the character of 
the regulation was substantially related to promotion of the 
general welfare; and whether through the regulation government 
is asking only some people to bear public burdens that, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole in 
achieving admittedly legitimate public objectives.60 
All of this is the gist of the environmental protection 
regulatory takings cases such Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, which are cited and 
discussed in Murr v. Wisconsin.61 In Lucas, an individual 
purchased two oceanfront lots on a South Carolina barrier island 
for nearly one million dollars with the intention to build single- 
family homes.62 Two years later, the state amended its beachfront 
management legislation to include Lucas’ land in the act’s 
prohibition against building any habitable structures.63 While 
recognizing that landowners must conform to nuisance control 
regulations, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this regulation 
 
56. Id. at 130–131. 
57. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
58. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
59. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630–32. 
60. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
61. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–43 (2017). 
62. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992). 
63. Id. at 1007. 
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amounted to a categorical taking since it deprived Lucas of all 
economic benefit of ownership of the parcel as a whole, and thus, 
warranted just compensation.64 
In Palazzolo, an individual had purchased eighteen acres on 
Winnapaug Pond, an environmentally sensitive wetland, in 
Westerly, Rhode Island, through a corporate entity in 1959, well 
in advance of the Coastal Resources Management legislation first 
adopted by Rhode Island in 1971.65 When the corporation 
dissolved in 1978, the title to the land was transferred to Mr. 
Palazzolo.66 Over the years, Palazzolo submitted several  
ambitious development plans for the land to the state Coastal 
Resources Management Council, none of which were approved as 
submitted.67 Palazzolo sued the state, raising a Lucas-like claim 
that he had been totally deprived of all economic benefit from his 
ownership of the land.68 On this point, Palazzolo was undercut at 
the U.S. Supreme Court by the jointly stipulated facts to the effect 
that there was a small developable upland portion of the larger 
parcel as a whole worth at least $200,000 upon which a 
substantial residence could be built.69 Because the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court had not undertaken a full Penn Central analysis, 
the case was remanded back to the state courts for further 
proceedings.70 
 
64. Id. at 1019. 
65. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613–14 (2001). 
66. Id. at 614. 
67. Id. at 614–15. 
68. Id. at 615–16. 
69. Id. at 616, 622. 
70. Id. at 632. On remand, the Rhode Island Superior Court engaged in  a 
thorough Penn Central analysis and ruled in favor of the State, holding that: 
(1) the owner’s proposed residential development of the property constituted a 
public nuisance because it would have resulted in ecological disaster to the 
pond the salt marsh bordered; (2) as the development constituted a public 
nuisance, the State’s denial of the fill permits could not constitute a taking; (3) 
under the public trust doctrine, the portion of the owner’s property that lay 
below the 1986 mean high water mark could never be developed; (4) the case 
fell under a partial takings inquiry because the State’s coastal development 
regulations did not ban all economically beneficial use of the property; (5) the 
regulations did not have an adverse economic impact on the owner because 
development costs of the property would actually result in an economic loss to 
the owner; (6) the owner’s investment-backed expectations were not 
realistically achievable, and thus, the third-prong of the Penn Central analysis 
was not satisfied; and (7) there was no Fifth Amendment taking. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, No. WM 88- 
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In both of these cases, the impact of the regulations on the 
“parcel as a whole” was crucial. If all or substantially all of the 
economic value of the parcel of the whole was deprived by the 
regulation as in Lucas, then there was a compensable taking.71 If 
the landowner retained substantial economic value in the parcel 
as a whole (albeit significantly reduced by the regulation), as in 
Palazzolo, then there was not a compensable taking.72 Obviously, 
identifying the proper “parcel as a whole” may be determinative of 
the outcome of the case. In Lucas, the parcel as a whole was the 
two oceanfront lots together that the owner could no longer use for 
any development.73 In Palazzolo, the parcel as a whole was the 
entire eighteen-acre tract (including the dry upland developable 
portion) and not just the wetlands portion upon which Mr. 
Palazzolo was not permitted to fill and build.74 Similarly, in Murr 
v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court had to address “a question that 
is linked to the ultimate determination whether a regulatory 
taking has occurred: What is the proper unit of property against 
which to assess the effect of the challenged governmental 
action?”75 
II. MAJORITY ANALYSIS IN MURR V. WISCONSIN 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion recognizes that there are 
two competing objectives of the Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, which seeks to balance the right of the individual 
private property owner to retain and enjoy the interests and 
freedoms at the core of private property ownership against the 
government’s well-established power to adjust those rights for the 
public good.76 Kennedy then notes that striking that  balance 
must be driven “by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to 
prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.’”77 
 
0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5–8, *14–15 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005). 
71. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
72. 533 U.S. at 632. 
73. 505 U.S. at 1006–07. 
74. See 533 U.S. at 631–32. 
75. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617–18). 
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Striking that proper balance in regulatory takings cases will 
require “a careful inquiry informed by the specifics of the case,” 
including a comparison of the value of the property both before 
and after the imposition of the regulation to measure whether the 
regulation has gone too far.78 If all or substantially all of the 
economic value of the property as a whole is eliminated as a result 
of the regulation, then a taking has occurred.79 If the property 
owner is still left with a significant portion of economic value or 
beneficial use from the property as a whole although some rights 
have been impinged upon and some value lost, then a taking is not 
likely to have occurred.80 In order to make that comparison, 
Justice Kennedy says that it is necessary to identify “the proper 
unit of property against which to assess the effect of the 
challenged governmental action.”81 The Murrs argued that the 
proper unit of property for this assessment is Lot E, the 
undeveloped lot rendered essentially valueless since it can no 
longer be separately sold or developed according to the State of 
Wisconsin and the County of Saint Croix.82 The State and County 
argued that the proper unit of property for this assessment is the 
now merged property as a whole, Lots E and F together, which 
retained in excess of 90% of their original value, despite the 
impact of the regulation.83 
This assessment process can be conceptualized as a fraction, 
the numerator of which is the value of the property retained by 
the owner after the impact of the regulation and the denominator 
of which is the value of the property as a whole prior to the 
imposition of the regulation. What is no longer in the numerator  
is the value of the property rights lost or diminished as a result of 
the regulation.84 The Court will not focus only on the property 
 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1942 (quoting Palazolo, 533 U.S. at 617). 
80. See id. at 1943 (citing Palazolo, 533 U.S. at 617). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 1941. 
83. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin at 21, 2526, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 
1933 (No. 15-214) (noting that the state and county restated the lower court’s 
decision affirming summary judgment for the state and county). 
84. Cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
497 (1987) (“Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare   
the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains 
in the property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the 
unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.’” 
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rights targeted by the regulation if the property as a whole 
continues to retain substantial value and use.85 
Justice Kennedy refers to the identification of the proper unit 
of property for this assessment as the “denominator question,”86 
and says that “no single consideration can supply the exclusive 
test for determining the denominator. Instead, courts must 
consider a number of factors. These include the treatment of the 
land under state and local law; the physical characteristics of the 
land; and the prospective value of the regulated land.”87 
The majority opinion says that courts first “should give 
substantial weight to the treatment of the land, in particular how 
it is bounded or divided, under state and local law,” and also other 
legitimate restrictions of state or local law affecting the 
“subsequent use and dispensation of the property.”88 In this 
regard, the parties had each argued that state and local law 
favored their position.89 The Murrs urged the Court to adopt a 
presumption that lot lines established under applicable state law 
define the relevant parcel in every instance, making Lot E alone 
the proper denominator.90 Wisconsin argued that state law had  
for forty years included the challenged merger provisions which 
would consider the two lots as a single whole, making Lots E and 
F combined the proper denominator.91 
Justice Kennedy rejected both parties’ request to have the 
Court adopt a “formalistic rule to guide the parcel inquiry” 
because “[n]either proposal suffices to capture the central legal 
and factual principles that inform reasonable expectations about 
property interests.”92 Lot boundaries alone cannot be the sole test 
 
 
(quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1192 (1967))). 
85. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944. 
86. Id. at 1943 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 
497). 
87. Id. at 1945. 
88. Id. 
89. See Brief for Petitioner at 27–29, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214); 
Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 83, at 37–43; Brief for 
Respondent St. Croix County at 28–35, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214). 
90. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947. 
91. See Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 83, at 1. 
92. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946. 
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for a variety of reasons identified in the opinion.93 Several states’ 
lot lines have “varying degrees of formality” and may be adjusted 
informally by their owners with “minimal governmental 
oversight.”94 In locales where minimum lot size may be more 
formally established by state or local law, “there often are existing 
lots that do not meet the new requirements,” and it is not 
uncommon for local zoning and subdivision laws to include both a 
grandfathering of non-conforming lots in separate ownership and 
a merger provision for contiguous substandard lots in common 
ownership.95 
Lot lines are significant, but so are reasonable restrictions 
such as merger provisions when adopted as part of a legislative 
determination to adjust rights of property owners for a legitimate 
public purpose. Merger provisions have been around for nearly a 
century and “form part of a regulatory scheme that establishes a 
minimum lot size in order to preserve open space while still 
allowing orderly development.”96 Justice Kennedy noted that the 
“decision to adopt the merger provision at issue here was for a 
specific and legitimate purpose, consistent with the widespread 
understanding that lot lines are not dominant or controlling in 
every case.”97 “Petitioners’ land was subject to this regulatory 
burden, moreover, only because of voluntary conduct in bringing 
the lots under common ownership after the regulations were 
enacted.”98 “As a result, the valid merger of the lots under state 
law informs the reasonable expectation they will be treated as a 
single [lot].”99 
The majority opinion also regarded the “physical 
characteristics of the property” as supporting its treatment as a 
“unified parcel.”100 The rough and steep terrain, their narrow 
shape and the riverfront location of these contiguous lots made “it 
reasonable to expect their range for potential uses might be 
limited.”101 The Murr siblings “could have anticipated public 
 
93. Id. at 1947–48. 
94. Id. at 1948. 
95. Id. at 1947. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1948. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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regulation might affect their enjoyment of their property, as the 
Lower St. Croix was a regulated area under federal, state, and 
local law long before petitioners possessed the land.”102 
As to the element of prospective value of the regulated land, 
Justice Kennedy noted that “the prospective value that Lot E 
brings to Lot F supports considering the two as one parcel for 
purposes of determining if there is a regulatory taking.”103 
Although the Murr siblings are prohibited from separately selling 
the lots or building separate residences on each lot, this restriction 
is mitigated by the offsetting benefits of “using the property as an 
integrated whole, allowing increased privacy and recreational 
space, plus the optimal location of any improvements.”104 The 
combined valuation also “shows their complementarity and 
supports their treatment as one parcel.”105 
Having thus found that the proper unit of property for 
assessing the impact of the merger regulation was Lots E and F 
combined, the majority had little difficulty in carrying out the 
Penn Central analysis.106 The regulation did not deprive the 
Murrs of all or substantially all of the economic value and use of 
their property because the reduction in value of combined Lot E 
and F was less than ten percent.107 The merger provision,  
adopted twenty years before their parents transferred the two lots 
to the Murr siblings, meant that they should not have reasonably 
expected that they could be separately developed once the siblings 
voluntarily accepted title in common ownership.108 The character 
of the governmental action was not a physical occupation, but 
rather more in the nature of a reasonable regulation adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good 
by protecting the scenic beauty and recreational quality of the St. 
Croix River.109 Accordingly, the majority opinion upheld the State 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1949. 
106. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949–50 (2017) (citing Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
107. Id. at 1949 (first citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); then citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
631 (2001); and then citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019). 
108. Id. at 1948. 
109. Id. at 1940 (citing WIS. STAT. § 30.27(l) (1973)). 
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Court of Appeals decision that there was no taking requiring just 
compensation.110 
III. DISSENTING ANALYSIS IN MURR V. WISCONSIN 
Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion in which 
Justices Thomas and Alito joined. Justice Roberts primarily 
dissents from the methodology that the majority employs to define 
the “private property” at issue in takings cases.111 Justice Roberts 
says that the Court’s “decisions have, time and again, declared 
that the Takings Clause protects private property rights as state 
law creates and defines them.”112 For Justice Roberts, this  
inquiry is straightforward: 
State laws define the boundaries of distinct units of land, 
and those boundaries should, in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances, determine the parcel at issue. 
Even in regulatory takings cases, the first step of the 
Takings Clause analysis is still to identify the relevant 
“private property.” States create property rights with 
respect to particular “things.” And in the context of real 
property, those “things” are horizontally bounded plots of 
land.113 
Instead, Justice Roberts regards the majority as constructing 
a “new, malleable definition of ‘private property[,]’ adopted solely 
‘for purposes of th[e] takings inquiry,’” which undermines the 
Takings Clause protection of individuals forced to bear the full 
weight of actions that should be borne by the public at large.114 
The perceived malleability arises from the majority’s approach to 
the “denominator question,” and its multi-element facts and 
 
110. Id. at 1950. 
111. Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing only about the 
majority’s methodology of determining the proper parcel to assess in 
regulatory takings cases and not the outcome in this particular case; Roberts 
begins his dissent by saying that the majority’s bottom-line conclusion that no 
taking has occurred does not trouble him since the majority presents a fair 
case that the Murrs can still make good use of both lots and that the 
challenged ordinance is a commonplace tool to preserve scenic areas for the 
benefit of the landowners and the public alike). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1953 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)). 
114. Id. at 1950 (alteration in original). 
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circumstances test for defining the private property at issue that 
included not only state and local property law concepts, but also 
the physical characteristics of the land, the prospective value of 
the regulated land, the reasonable expectations of the owner, 
background customs, and the whole of our legal tradition.115 The 
dissenting opinion suggests that the majority is stacking the deck 
in favor of the government by including these other factors in 
cases where the individual owns more than one contiguous parcel, 
because the majority said that the consideration of these other 
factors could easily and improperly be used to argue that the 
landowner should have anticipated that his holdings together 
would be treated as one parcel.116 
Justice Roberts acknowledges that the use of the multi- 
element facts and circumstances analysis from Penn Central is 
appropriate in determining whether a particular parcel of private 
property as a whole has been so burdened by a regulation to 
amount to a regulatory taking, but not at the earlier stage in 
which the particular piece of private property is identified or 
defined.117 This, for Justice Roberts, is a simper task resolved by 
reference to established state property law and for land that  
would normally be by the lot boundaries for the parcel affected by 
the regulation.118 
Since the majority, in Justice Roberts’ view, improperly 
conflated the multi-element approach into its method for defining 
the particular parcel at issue, he would have remanded the matter 
back to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals for a more straightforward 
determination of the property at issue before conducting its facts 
and circumstances analysis of whether the regulation had gone too 
far and amounted to a taking of the separate Lot E.119 
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion that 
questioned whether the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence 
arising from the “goes too far” approach of Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon can be reconciled with the original public meaning of the 
Takings  Clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  or  the  Privileges  or 
 
 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 1954. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1956. 
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Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.120 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
If, as is likely, the Supreme Court is going to continue to  
apply the Penn Central factors in takings cases, then the factor 
looking at the extent of regulation’s interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations of landowners will continue to be 
critical. Landowners will always want to claim that they had 
reasonable expectations to use the land for any and all of its 
potential economically valuable purposes. They will want to claim 
that any regulatory restriction that substantially diminishes the 
use of the property should amount to a taking. Government 
entities that adopt regulations that restrict use and development 
of property will continue to claim that there were legitimate public 
purposes for the regulation and the landowner has not been 
deprived by the regulation of all economical use and value in most 
instances. 
The majority opinion in Murr seems consistent with prior 
takings jurisprudence that the expectations of the landowners 
that they could use their land for any and all economically 
valuable purposes are not reasonable expectations in light of the 
various factors affecting its potential use such as the land’s 
physical characteristics, the prospective value of the land for 
different uses, and its treatment under applicable state and local 
law.121 These are the factors that Justice Kennedy articulates in 
his test for determining the proper parcel as a whole,122 but they 
 
120. Id. at 1957 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (first citing Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); then citing Legal Tender Cases, 12 
Wall. 457, 551 (1871); then citing Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 
(1879); then citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); 
and then citing Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: 
Why the Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but 
the Fourteenth Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008)). 
121. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (stating that 
“a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can  limit  the 
value of land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as 
reasonable by all concerned”); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (noting that 
“reasonable expectations must be understood in light of” the common law and 
state regulations on property); see also Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262 
(1907). 
122. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945 (majority opinion). 
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certainly inform the owner’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations. If state and local law restrict the use and 
development of the land, then it is not reasonable for the owner to 
expect that the land could still be used for a prohibited purpose. 
The Supreme Court was focused on the denominator question 
in Murr: how should courts identify the proper parcel as a whole 
before applying the traditional multi-factor test from Penn Central 
to that specific parcel.123 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion says 
that no single factor can supply the exclusive test for determining 
the denominator and he offers up a multi-factor test including the 
treatment of the land under state and local law, the physical 
characteristics of the land, and the prospective value of the 
land.124 The majority opinion assesses the applicable state and 
local law to include the regulatory scheme adopted in 1976, which 
limited development of parcels along the St. Croix River with less 
than one acre of land suitable for development, and which 
mandated merger of substandard lots in common ownership.125 
Because the Murr parents in the 1960’s had been prescient in 
arranging their ownership of Lots E and F in separate ownership, 
the lots, while owned by the parents, were not subject to the 
regulation’s restrictions because of the grandfathering provision of 
the regulations.126 While the intentions of the Murr parents in 
titling the two lots in separate forms of ownership are not 
discussed in either the majority or dissenting opinions, it is likely 
that the Murr parents had different intentions for what they 
planned to do with Lots E and F. Their actions in building a 
recreational cabin on Lot F demonstrate their intentions to use 
that lot for family enjoyment and recreational occupancy. Their 
intentions with respect to Lot E are not so clear, but their actions 
in acquiring it three years after acquiring Lot F and not titling it 
the same way as Lot F may mean that they always intended to 
use, develop, or sell Lot E separately from Lot F. In fact, because 
of the grandfathering provisions of the regulations, the Murr 
parents could have separately sold or developed Lots E and F, 
even after the adoption of the regulations in 1976 and up until 
 
 
123. Id. at 1944. 
124. Id. at 1945. 
125. Id. at 1948. 
126. Id. at 1940. 
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1995, when the Murr siblings accepted title to both lots in their 
four names in common ownership of both lots. At that point in 
1995, the lots were in common ownership and could no longer be 
separately sold or developed since they separately lacked the 
minimum one acre of land suitable for development. When 
combined, Lots E and F just about met the one-acre minimum. 
Justice Kennedy appears to place a significant amount of 
weight to the change in titling of the Murr lots that occurred in 
1994 and 1995 stating: 
Petitioners’ land was subject to this regulatory burden, 
moreover, only because of voluntary conduct in bringing 
the lots under common ownership after the regulations 
were enacted. As a result, the valid merger of the lots 
under state law informs the reasonable expectation that 
they will be treated as a single property.127 
Chief Justice Roberts in dissent is critical of the majority’s 
multi-factor approach wherein “the government can argue that— 
based on all the circumstances and the nature of the regulations— 
Lots A and B should be considered one ‘parcel,’”128 but the dissent 
does not directly or indirectly question the majority’s 
characterization of the merger as resulting from the “voluntary 
conduct” of the petitioners. 
It is true that the Murr parents conveyed the lots out of 
separate ownership and into common ownership by their children 
in 1994 and 1995.129 That certainly was the voluntary act of the 
Murr parents and it could also be said that acceptance of those 
conveyances by the petitioner-Murr siblings was voluntary since 
donees of gifts do not have to accept them. However, it would  
have been highly unusual under the circumstances for the Murr 
children to decline the generosity of their parents on account of 
the form of title being conveyed. It also was highly unlikely that 
the Murr children would have been focused on the impact of the 
regulations then in existence on how they should or should not 
have accepted title from their parents. Perhaps their attorneys 
should have counseled them to continue the separate titling of 
Lots E and F with one lot being placed in the names of the four 
 
127. Id. at 1948. 
128. Id. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
129. Id. at 1941 (majority opinion). 
 2018] REGULATORY TAKINGS 119 
 
children and the other in the name of a corporate entity as their 
parents had done, and perhaps it was malpractice of the attorneys 
not to have done so. However, that does not mean that it was the 
intention of the Murr children, in accepting the transfer of both 
lots in the names of the four Murr siblings, to have the lots 
merged for purposes of future sale and/or development. Justice 
Kennedy’s characterization of the petitioners conduct as 
voluntarily producing a merger of the two lots into a single lot 
seems to miss the question of the intentions of the Murr children, 
which should have been more thoroughly examined. 
Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the merger as resulting from 
the voluntary conduct of the parties also seems inconsistent with a 
portion of the Palazzolo opinion. Specifically, it is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s rejection of the State of Rhode Island’s 
argument that Mr. Palazzolo lacked standing to challenge the 
coastal management regulations that restricted the use of his land 
because the regulations were adopted before the land had been 
transferred from his solely owned corporation to his name 
individually.130 The Supreme Court rejected the State’s  claim 
that Palazzolo lacked standing because he acquired formal legal 
title after the enactment of the CRMC statute.131 The Court was 
unwilling “to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause” since 
“[f]uture generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable 
limitations on the use and value of land.”132 
The Murr siblings are that future generation in this case. 
Their parents held the lots in separate ownership in 1976 when 
the regulations were adopted.133 The Murr parents could have 
challenged the application of the regulations to either of their lots 
in 1976 as a taking had the regulations not contained the 
grandfathering provision for substandard lots in separate 
ownership as of the adoption date.134 Grandfathering of pre- 
existing nonconforming properties or uses is a common statutory 
element when land use regulations are adopted or amended to 
impose restrictions that had not previously applied.135 Without 
 
130. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940. 
134. WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.08(4) (West 2017). 
135. Grandfathering of pre-existing nonconforming properties or uses is 
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grandfathering, governmental entities adopting or further 
restricting zoning or other regulatory schemes would be inundated 
with takings claims. The Murr parents owned their lots in 1976 
and one could say that they also owned the grandfathering rights 
conferred by the regulations. It is not clear that the Murr parents 
intended to forfeit those grandfathered rights in 1994 and 1995 
when they transferred the lots to their future generation children. 
The intentions of the parties should have been more thoroughly 
examined by the Court before concluding that there was 
“voluntary conduct in bringing the lots under common ownership 
after the regulations were enacted.”136 
 
CONCLUSION 
In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court took on the question 
of how to identify the proper “parcel as a whole” for purposes of 
conducting a Penn Central facts and circumstances takings 
analysis of the impact of merger provisions in environmental 
protection zoning regulations on multiple lots owned by a 
family.137 Are the multiple lots to be treated as separate parcels  
or are they to be combined into a single parcel as a result of the 
merger provisions? As Justice Kennedy notes, the answer to this 
preliminary question may be determinative of the Penn Central 
analysis.138 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, articulated a new 
facts and circumstances test for identifying the proper “parcel as a 
whole” (or “denominator”) that includes the treatment of the land 
under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the land, 
and the prospective value of the regulated land.139 Using those 
factors in this case, Justice Kennedy concluded that the proper 
parcel to analyze under the Penn Central factors was the merged 
Lots E and F as a single combined parcel.140 
 
probably more commonplace than the merger provisions that Justice 
Kennedy says are legitimate exercises of government power “with a long 
history of state and local merger regulations that originated nearly a century 
ago.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947. 
136. Id. at 1948. 
137. Id. at 1952. 
138. Id. at 1952–53. 
139. Id. at 1945. 
140. Id. at 1949. 
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Justice Roberts dissented from the methodology utilized by 
the majority of constructing a preliminary facts and circumstances 
test to be employed in identifying the proper parcel before 
conducting the traditional Penn Central factors analysis.141 He 
“would stick with [the] traditional approach: State law defines 
boundaries of distinct parcels of land, and those boundaries should 
determine the ‘private property’ at issue in regulatory takings 
cases.”142 The traditional approach, for Justice Roberts, means 
that the proper parcel in this case should have been Lot E alone 
(although he does agree that ownership of adjacent property may 
be taken into account in the subsequent Penn Central analysis).143 
The new majority approach may not make takings cases all that 
much more complicated than they already are since landowners, 
government entities adopting regulatory measures, and courts 
adjudicating the effect of those restrictions on private property 
will still have to conduct overall facts and circumstances 
balancing analyses. The extent of interference with distinct and 
reasonable investment-backed expectations will still be a critical 
factor. The intentions of the owners and how their investment- 
backed expectations are formed when more than one parcel of 
private property is involved should be examined more thoroughly 
by courts than was done by the majority when it concluded that 
the Murr siblings voluntarily submitted their previously 
grandfathered lots to the regulatory burden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141. Id. at 1950. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 1956. 
